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 “Canada’s NATO Commitment:  
Current Controversies, Past Debates, and Future Issues” 
 
Erika Simpson 
 
Introduction 
Canada has been a committed member of NATO since its founding in 1949. It has 
been one of Canada’s most controversial commitments—as evidenced by the recent 
debate about NATO enlargement and the controversy over NATO’s bombing of Kosovo 
and Serbia. In fact, we can probably expect yet another debate about Canada’s 
commitment to NATO later this year as Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has promised 
to question the Alliance’s continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. There is also bound 
to be future dissension over whether the allies should undertake a ‘second round of 
expansion’, taking in countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. While issues related to 
NATO expansion and the war in Kosovo have dominated the news lately, it is also useful 
to stand back and look at Canada’s overall relationship to NATO. This essay surveys 
some current controversies, past debates, and possible future issues related to Canada’s 
NATO involvement since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. 
 
Current Controversies  
Expanding NATO Membership could be Risky 
 Last spring, before the war in Kosovo, NATO was preparing for its fiftieth 
anniversary celebration in April. The plans were to have a big party in Washington, 
Celine Dion was to sing, and NATO jet fighters were to fly in formation overhead. One 
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achievement the allies wanted to celebrate was NATO’s expansion from 16 to 19 
members, taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the first round of NATO 
enlargement. 
NATO expansion had been vigorously opposed by the Russians—every political 
party in Russia was opposed—but at the last moment President Boris Yeltsin agreed not 
to forcefully oppose NATO’s enlargement. Yet the issue still raised a great deal of 
controversy. Expansion was seen by some as a fall-back to regional alliance formations 
and balance of power politics. There were fears it represented a reversal back to the 
policy of containment, to the focus on military force, to collective defence, and possibly 
extended deterrence. Others viewed expansion as a challenge to current efforts, under the 
United Nations (UN) for example, to coordinate security at lower levels of defence 
expenditure. In many respects, the issue of expansion raised other questions about 
priorities and preferences–should we expand a regional collective defence organisation, 
possibly at the expense of efforts to reform a universal collective security organisation, 
like the UN? 
There were others who wrote about the possibility that NATO expansion could 
risk another security dilemma, that efforts NATO made to increase its security could 
lessen Russia’s sense of security, leading possibly to greater tensions, and possibly 
military competition—to another arms race in a divided Europe. Others argued that the 
West was being short-sighted. We—that is the West—were urging Russia to undertake 
onerous democratic and market reforms in a difficult period of transition. At the same 
time, NATO expansion would provide Russian nationalists with another excuse to turn 
back the clock, and reverse reforms. 
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Despite these criticisms, plans were made for NATO to expand in any case. But 
the big party last April was cancelled in favour of a quiet meeting about what to do about 
the crisis in Kosovo. The black ties and tuxedos were never unpacked. 
Now that the first round of expansion has taken place, NATO policy-makers must 
forge a consensus among 19 allies—as NATO officially runs by consensus, not majority 
vote—to decide who will be accepted in the ‘second round’. There will still be risks that 
expansion, the first or the promised second round, could lead Russia to eventually move 
some of its conventional or nuclear arsenal into defensive positions along a newly-
defined border, along a new Central Front. 
We also do not know which countries to invite into NATO during the second 
round. Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Bulgaria want 
membership. NATO policy-makers are merely uttering ambiguous phrases right now, 
such as ‘the door is open’ to NATO expansion. Their reluctance stems, in part, from 
concerns about the risk of undermining the credibility of NATO’s article 5. I call article 5 
‘the three Musketeers’ article. It guarantees that an attack against one is an attack against 
all. This is by far the most important article in NATO’s founding treaty. For example, 
during the Kosovo debate, the fact that Serbia’s President had not actually attacked a 
NATO ally was raised as a salient issue. Technically, Mr. Slobodan Milosovic had not 
violated article 5. This important article raises other troubling questions. For instance, if 
Hungary, now a NATO ally, is drawn into a war with Romania over Transylvania, an 
area over which they have argued for centuries, are we automatically involved? Both 
countries made a great effort to patch up their differences in order to be invited into the 
NATO club. But a few years or decades from now, if they fall into an armed conflict (just 
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as Greece and Turkey—NATO allies—have done), would we be left in a quandary about 
our article 5 commitment?  
It is fair to say that NATO expansion posed, and will continue to pose, a daunting 
challenge and commitment; one that is not entirely risk–free.  
 
The War in Yugoslavia and the Debate at Home: 
Most recently, the Canadian government’s strong support of NATO’s actions in 
Serbia and Kosovo during the war seemed to many to be proof of the country’s loyalty to 
the Alliance. For example, the fact that the Canadian government, along with most of the 
other allies, did not publicly raise doubts and reservations about the decision to bomb 
Serbia and Kosovo was presented by the United States Information Agency as proof of 
these countries’ basic allegiance to NATO .1 
However, the bombing did incite substantial public discussion about the role 
Canada should take in NATO’s management of the crisis in Kosovo and Serbia. It also 
prompted fears about the measure of Canada’s NATO obligations in case the war spilled 
over into the rest of the Balkans. During the crisis in Kosovo, concerns were voiced about 
whether Canada should condone bombing a sovereign country that had not attacked any 
member of the Alliance, and that was technically out of NATO’s territory of 
responsibility. That CF-18 Canadian fighter planes were sent to assist with the aerial 
bombing of Serbia and Kosovo prompted debate over whether air strikes were necessary 
or morally unjustifiable.2  
Considerable controversy also arose over the prospect of contributing ground 
forces to Kosovo. Many radio hot-line shows burned up the airwaves on this issue, and 
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the question of whether we should take in refugees. The Defence Department housed 
thousands of refugees, temporarily, at various Canadian Forces bases. Not surprisingly, 
the possibility of a ground war in the former Yugoslavia incited a great deal of debate 
across the country and in the media. 
While it is not yet known whether the federal cabinet was internally divided about 
all these sorts of questions, certain comments by Lloyd Axworthy indicate that, as 
Foreign Minister, he harboured reservations about unequivocally supporting NATO’s 
actions in the Balkans.3  Put simply, the war served to remind Canadians that NATO 
membership entails obligations and commitments that might be difficult to sustain.  
As a NATO member, Canada has been a committed contributor to this 
international organization, and governments have wanted to remain constructively 
engaged for fifty years. But just ask anyone within a relationship and they can tell you 
that any commitment entails obligations—challenging obligations that may be 
comforting at times, while very trying at others—sometimes even grounds for separation 
in more demanding circumstances. It is worth reflecting on how Canada has managed its 
relationship with NATO since the end of the Cold War.4  
 
Debates since the End of the Cold War 
Challenge and Commitment: 
The Mulroney government's 1987 Defence White Paper, was called “Challenge 
and Commitment,” or sometimes rather derisively the ‘coffee table white paper’ because 
of its many colour photographs. In 1987 the Defence Department promised a significant 
increase in defence spending—because of, ostensibly, the challenge from the Soviet 
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Union—and it promised to strengthen Canada's NATO commitments. Specifically, the 
government intended to acquire a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of 
10-12 billion dollars. It wanted to double our troop strength in Europe and modernise our 
equipment on NATO’s Central Front for high-intensity warfare. Basically, the 
government committed to spend 183 billion dollars on defence over the next fifteen years 
until the year 2002. It was a very expensive package for countering the primary threat of 
the Cold War. 
 Then a couple of years later, in 1989, the Conservatives suddenly announced an 
abrupt change in defence policy, freezing defence spending. They cutback major capital 
expenditures. The nuclear submarines were cancelled, as well as new main battle tanks, 
and plans to deploy a division in Europe. It was evident, to almost everyone, that the 
nature of the threat from the Soviet Union—the challenge—had changed. We no longer 
had to, or could, devote so much money and resources toward improving our collective 
defence, particularly our NATO commitments.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the Persian Gulf War in 
the winter of 1991, Canadians continued to debate whether there was any reason for 
Canada to retain its NATO commitments, especially its expensive troop commitment in 
Europe. The government spent approximately 1 billion dollars a year merely to maintain 
our troops in Europe—and that did not include the cost of training and equipping the rest 
of the Armed Forces, which were also structured primarily for big-league NATO roles, 
including war in Europe, with all the related costs of equipment, training and supply.  
 
Withdrawal from the Central Front in Germany: 
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The government's September 1991 announcement of its intention to withdraw all 
but 1200 troops from the Central Front in Germany came as no great surprise. It was 
estimated that a gradual withdrawal would result in financial savings of some 1.2 billion 
dollars over five years. Then in February 1992, the Minister of Finance announced plans 
to withdraw Canada's contingent from Europe completely. The members of the Canadian 
delegation were given only a few hours’ notice of the change in policy. Initially the 
decision was difficult for them to justify, especially since Prime Minister Mulroney had 
only a few months before assured Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany that Canada 
intended to retain a visible military presence on European soil. The European allies and 
the American military representatives at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) sharply criticised the timing of Canada's decision, particularly as it was taken 
without consulting the other allies through proper channels.5 
On the other hand, Canadian delegates to NATO and SHAPE in Brussels 
consoled themselves by pointing to the significant role Canada's Ambassador to NATO 
was playing in establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). They also 
lauded Canada's commitment to European security through its peacekeeping efforts in the 
former Yugoslavia.6 
 
Canadian Efforts to Promote NACC and Peacekeeping 
The idea of according former Warsaw Pact nations associate membership in 
NATO had been broached by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1991. When the possibility of 
associate status was rejected—mainly by Britain and France because of the security 
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guarantee it entailed—the Canadian Ambassador to NATO worked to institute a form of 
NATO membership for the Eastern Europeans under NACC auspices.7  
 The portrayal of Canada's contribution to the peacekeeping operation in 
Yugoslavia as a renewed contribution to European security was also a source of 
consolation to the Canadians in Brussels, whose efforts were assisted by the high media-
profile of the Commander of the UN Forces, Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie. 
Indeed, it was not long before Canadians at NATO headquarters were receiving requests 
from the other allies, including Americans, for more information on peacekeeping. While 
high-level representatives from allied countries such as Britain and Germany pointed out 
that Canada's most valuable contribution to European security remained the maintenance 
on European soil of troops ear-marked for NATO, in the early 1990s it seemed as if the 
sudden shift of interest to peacekeeping might somehow brighten Canada's image at 
NATO headquarters.8 
 Although Canada's status at NATO headquarters appeared to diminish with the 
announcement of the troop withdrawal, the general attitude of the Canadian delegation 
was one of resignation; indications were that the Canadian announcement was a precursor 
to similar announcements of reductions and cut-backs among the other allies. It was clear 
that Canada would remain an active participant in the North Atlantic Council, in the 
hundreds of committees at NATO and SHAPE, and in the discussions surrounding the 
implementation of the ‘New Strategic Concept.’  As NATO’s Secretary-General, 
Manfred Woerner, assured the allies in February 1992, after the announcement of the 
troop withdrawal, Canada would meet its other commitments to NATO.9 
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Canada’s Continuing Alliance Commitments: 
 Despite the end of the Cold War, many of Canada's other NATO commitments 
remained unchanged after the 1992 announcement. For instance, the nation retained the 
capability to dispatch an expeditionary brigade group, two squadrons of CF-18s, and an air 
defence battery to Europe. The government was responsible for maintaining a Canadian 
Forces battalion prepared to deploy to Europe with the Allied Command Europe (ACE) 
Mobile Force or the NATO Composite Force. Canadians continued to serve as part of the 
NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and as aircrew 
aboard NATO AEW aircraft. Canadian destroyers and frigates were prepared to sail with the 
Standing Naval Force Atlantic while eleven destroyers and frigates, one supply ship, three 
submarines, fourteen long-range patrol aircraft and twenty-five helicopters retained their 
role in patrolling the North Atlantic as part of NATO's ‘augmentation’ forces. Canada was 
to do its part to defend NATO's Canada-U.S. region a well as contribute to the North 
American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which is responsible for the defence of 
NATO's largest single land mass. Canada also offered the allied countries its facilities and 
territory for military training, such as those at CFB Goose Bay in Labrador and CFB Shilo 
in Manitoba, and the underwater naval testing range at Nanoose Bay in British Columbia.10 
 The Conservative government continued to demonstrate its support for NATO 
through other means. The portion of the infrastructure budget at NATO headquarters paid 
by Canada, although not widely known, was viewed at NATO headquarters as a significant 
contribution. The government's intention to retain approximately 650 Canadian personnel at 
NATO and SHAPE as military planners, attachés, and representatives on the Canadian 
delegation was also seen to be an important commitment. And the announcement regarding 
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the renewal of a ten-year contract to train approximately 6,000 German Armed Forces 
annually at CFB Shilo and CFB Goose Bay was described as yet another example of 
Canada's intention to help strengthen the Alliance. Although aboriginal residents 
complained about the environmental effects of low-flying jets, and Goose Bay was slated to 
be closed as the United States deemed it too expensive for training purposes, German and 
other NATO planes continued to train at this base.11 
 
The Chretien Government’s Defence Review: 
 In November 1993, the new Liberal government of Jean Chretien announced a 
comprehensive review of Canadian defence policy, precipitating another debate about 
Canada’s NATO commitments. By February 1994, a Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and House of Commons was established to initiate consultations and report to the 
government. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence 
Policy, some policy-makers continued to argue that the Alliance had to remain a priority 
for both defence and foreign policy. They emphasised the wide array of new conflicts in 
the world, particularly in Europe, the instability of the Russian leadership, and the 
remaining military threat. They advised that the government ensure the country had 
modern military equipment and sufficient tri-service personnel to fulfill the strategic 
requirements of deterrence as well as NATO's New Strategic Concept. Canada, they 
argued, must continue to structure and train its military for mid-to-high intensity combat 
operations. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee, they acceded that Canada 
should contribute to United Nations' peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, but such 
contributions should remain a low priority for the Canadian Forces relative to their 
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general combat capability for defending Canada and its allies. As some argued, the 
alternatives posed a risk to security and stability as well as to Alliance relations. In their 
opinion, NATO was adapting to this new environment of uncertainty, and NATO alone 
retained the political coherence and military capabilities to ensure collective defence and 
security.12 
 Others argued that NATO was now less a priority given the disintegration of the 
Soviet military threat and the disappearance of both the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. 
They noted the unlikelihood of an attack across Europe's Central Front, and frequently 
cited the historic inability of military alliances to combat diffuse threats such as ethnic 
conflict, environmental degradation, and human rights violations. Some suggested that 
Canada should de-emphasize its military commitments to NATO while retaining a 
diplomatic and consultative presence in the higher councils of the Alliance. Alternatively, 
many favoured increasing Canada's foreign aid and contributions to UN agencies and 
operations. There were also related proposals for new defence priorities that would 
emphasize the monitoring and surveillance of Canadian territorial waters and air space as 
well as expand the country's commitment to peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. 
Rather than attempt to maintain a general-purpose, combat-capable army, navy, and air 
force, there were calls for specialization. Accordingly, Canadian Forces should be 
restructured and retrained in order to contribute more productively to peacekeeping and 
the various initiatives outlined in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace. Given this new 
environment, there would be unnecessary risks and expenses in adhering to the prevailing 
assumptions, practices, and institutions of the past fifty years.13  
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In the midst of this defence review, the government announced its commitment to 
the conversion of Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis in Nova Scotia into a multinational 
training centre for UN and NATO-affiliated personnel. At the new Lester B. Pearson 
Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the government planned to 
sponsor some training for military and civilian personnel from countries participating in 
NATO's Partnership for Peace, as well as from developing countries under Canada's 
Military Training Assistance Program. This decision provoked yet more controversy 
about peacekeeping training and the advisability of establishing a privatized 
peacekeeping training centre.14 
 
NATO and the 1994 Defence White Paper 
 In December, the Department of National Defence released The 1994 Defence 
White Paper, announcing that Canada would remain a full and active member of NATO. 
The monolithic threat to Western Europe had disappeared, and the principal 
responsibility for European defence lay with the Europeans, but at the same time, the 
government valued the transatlantic link and recognised that the Alliance had made 
progress in adapting to a post-Cold War world. The White Paper noted in particular those 
aspects of NATO that reflected a cooperative approach to European security relations, 
including the creation of NACC, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the development of the 
Combined Joint Task Force Concept. According to the White Paper, this perspective on 
NATO ‘underpinned’ the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a 
crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces Canada maintained for all multilateral 
operations would immediately be made available to NATO.15 Yet for the first time, the 
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Defence Department consistently referred to Canada’s NATO defence commitments after 
pointing out the country’s UN obligations. This seemed to herald a fundamental 
reordering of Canada’s defence priorities.16 
 
The Costs of NATO Enlargement: 
 Predictably, the release of this White Paper in 1994 did not terminate the debate 
over the measure and extent of Canada's NATO commitments. Gradually some high-
level foreign and defence policy advisors became concerned about the costs of NATO 
enlargement for Canada. Prime Minister Jean Chretien initially supported expanding 
NATO membership from sixteen to twenty member states (adding Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and Slovenia). However, estimates of the costs of enlargement tended to 
vary widely, in part because of uncertainty about the number of new members that should 
be admitted. Nevertheless, in 1997 many high-level American officials agreed that 
NATO expansion would cost somewhere between US$27 billion and US$35 billion over 
the next 13 years. Would Canada’s defence costs jump with NATO enlargement? 
Behind-the-scenes, some senior policy-makers worried about the looming costs of 
NATO expansion in the twenty-first century, and about the extent to which Canada 
should or could support the rebuilding of the newer allies’ defence systems. In the weeks 
prior to ratification of the enlargement decision in the United States Congress, the US 
State Department concurred with NATO’s revised assessment that enlargement could 
cost only $1.5 billion rather than $27-35 billion. Yet these wide variations in estimates 
among such reputable analysts as the United States Congressional Budget Office, the 
Pentagon, the State Department, and NATO headquarters raised more questions about the 
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measure of Canada’s NATO commitments, and about whether all these estimates might 
prove to be low. Even as the Alliance opened the door to the first round of expansion, 
many Canadians worried about the potential cost of Canada’s NATO obligations.17 
 
Future Issues 
NATO’s Nuclear Strategy and the Middle Powers Initiative: 
One issue that promises to incite further controversy revolves around Canada’s 
critique of NATO’s reliance upon nuclear deterrence strategy. The NATO Summit in 
Washington last April opened the door to a broad-ranging review of NATO’s nuclear 
weapons policy. NATO’s New Strategic Concept, which since 1991 has reaffirmed the 
Alliance’s commitment to relying upon nuclear weapons, will be reviewed and re-
examined. Pressure from the leaders of the Middle Powers Initiative and the Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States, particularly from key policy-makers in Canada, Germany, Sweden, 
Norway, and Japan, may result in a serious review of the Strategic Concept. In particular, 
key policy-makers from the Middle Powers Initiative could influence NATO’s decision-
making regarding its nuclear commitments, leading to important and subtle shifts in the 
Alliance’s deterrence strategy over the period between 2000-2002. 
The issue that NATO has promised to review is of historical, practical, as well as 
theoretical interest. After fifty years of relying upon nuclear weapons for our defence, 
recent developments, including the end of the Cold War, have presented an opportunity 
to enter the new millennium with a plan for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Many 
distinguished world figures are arguing that the risk of retaining nuclear arsenals in 
perpetuity far outweighs any possible benefit imputed to nuclear deterrence. They believe 
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that the end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to 
eliminate nuclear weapons, an opportunity that must be exploited quickly or it will be 
lost. They see the Middle Powers Initiative as a bold attempt to encourage NATO leaders 
to ‘break free from their Cold War mindsets’ and move rapidly to a nuclear weapon-free 
world.  
Hundreds of international and nongovernmental organisations have focused on 
abolishing nuclear weapons, and to buttress this grassroots effort the Middle Powers 
Initiative was launched in 1998. Countries without nuclear weapons coalesced and are 
now lobbying the nuclear-armed nations to disarm themselves. Canadian Senator 
Douglas Roche is the chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative, and joining Canada as 
members are other non-nuclear weapon states, such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, 
Japan, and Mexico. Whereas NATO’s Strategic Concept has hardly changed on the issue 
of maintaining reliance upon nuclear weapons since 1991, the Washington Summit 
Communiqué, issued by NATO heads on April 24, 1999, committed NATO to ‘review’ 
its strategic policy. At a news conference on April 24, Foreign Minister Axworthy 
confirmed the willingness of NATO “to have a review initiated” of its nuclear weapons 
policies. Explaining that this was the thrust of the recommendations that came out of the 
report of Canada’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Axworthy added: “It’s a message that 
the [Canadian] Prime Minister took [to] certain NATO leaders…  I think we have now 
gained an acknowledgement that such a review would be appropriate and that there 
would be directions to the NATO Council to start the mechanics of bringing that 
about.”18  
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This gives the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, and the 12 abstainers on the New 
Agenda Coalition’s 1998 resolution at the UN, a new opportunity to press for a ‘quality 
review’, not a perfunctory one. Members of the Middle Powers Initiative, headed by 
Senator Roche, believe that the NATO communiqué strengthens the possibility that 
appropriate representations can be made to a number of important countries around the 
world. Indeed, it was Canada, in its official policy statement, that urged NATO to begin a 
nuclear weapons review, and this was carried into the NATO Summit. Members of the 
Middle Powers Initiative are expected to press for further changes to NATO’s deterrence 
strategy in the near future.19 Success will depend on whether a new coalition of leaders 
from countries respected by the Nuclear Weapon States—especially by the United 
States—generates sufficient political momentum and media attention. 
 
Conclusion   
Canada’s policy record since the end of the Cold War indicates that we will 
remain committed to NATO, but on somewhat different terms than before. One seldom 
reaches the silver or golden anniversary in any relationship without experiencing doubts 
and the occasional shift in terms of commitment. Still, as many concede, this has been a 
relatively successful alliance over the last fifty years. The challenge for Canada, once 
again, is to remain constructively engaged—to chart a safer course—and to ensure 
NATO responds cost-effectively and responsibly. Canada must remind the other NATO 
allies that some arguments, controversy, debate, and dissension can and should be 
expected in what is alleged to be a democratic relationship—indeed, they may help 
improve this longstanding institution. 
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